China’s position on the ICC: The case of Syria

Yu-Ning Luo

Introduction

Since its establishment in 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has represented a milestone in prosecuting individuals for grave international crimes. However, it has also faced criticism for selective enforcement and its impact on state sovereignty. China, as a non-signatory to the Rome Statute, has consistently opposed the Court’s authority, citing the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. This stance has drawn increasing scrutiny, especially amid concerns over human rights violations in regions like Xinjiang. China’s veto of the 2014 Syria referral illustrates how it leverages the ICC’s jurisdictional limits to block initiatives that could undermine its interests. 

Analysis

1. How China deploy its influence on the ICC: The case of Syria 

The Syria case in 2014 is the only known instance where China directly vetoed an ICC referral at the Security Council. During the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, nearly 200,000 people were killed and millions displaced within just three years. Despite the high level of international attention, the ICC was unable to exercise jurisdiction since Syria was not a state party to the Rome Statute. Eventually, the UNSC failed to reach a consensus to pass the resolution referring the situation to the ICC since Russia and China exercised their veto power as permanent members.

2. The interests behind China’s veto

In the case of Syria, China reiterated its firm stance on states sovereignty, stressing that referring a situation to the ICC must be based on respecting the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of complementarity. Despite all these claims, China casting a veto was not merely driven by concerns about undermining the supremacy of state sovereignty, but also by a deep distrust of the other three permanent members, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, particularly regarding their abuse of the intervention under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

2.1 Political and economic interest

As an autocratic regime facing domestic turbulence and geopolitical tension, Syria had a long-term demand for a stable supply of arms and weapons, which was undoubtedly apparent to China. This implies China’s motive to support a government that opposes the Western agenda on human rights intervention. Moreover, the hostility toward the three major Western powers (the US, UK, and France) in the Middle East helps preserve the military-industrial competitiveness of both the Chinese government and its private sectors.

This shows how economic interests influence China’s political stances and strategic choices within international institutions. In this case, the veto power effectively enabled powerful states to block the ICC’s jurisdiction, providing a channel for serious violations of international criminal law. Moreover, it reflects how interests often take precedence over legitimacy in the agenda of great powers.

2.2 Prevent legal precedent

As a rising power with growing global presence and domestic sensitivities in regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, China has an inherent interest in resisting the expansion of international judicial authority. Supporting an ICC investigation into Syria without clear consent could weaken its ability to reject similar scrutiny in the future. Moreover, the practices of international legal bodies have the potential of gradually shifting the norm of state consent into universal accountability, which still remain as a major concern for China.

3. Political costs of casting veto power

While the interests behind protecting Syria from being subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC were highly tempting, the political cost of casting a veto was certainly not an abstract concept to China. Since the establishment of the UN, the imbalance power structure within the institution has been highly debated among states, particularly regarding the legitimacy of the veto power held by the five permanent states of the security council (P5). In the case of Syria which attracted wide attention, using a veto even risked being labeled as an obstructionist, thereby undermining both China’s image and the legitimacy of the UNSC.

Moreover, when mass violations against humanity occurred, the price of a veto could be especially high, considering that China has been under close international scrutiny for its domestic human rights record since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.   

Conclusion  

Of all these factors affecting China’s veto in the case of Syria, the major motives behind China were to counter Western influence, protect economic and political interests, and prevent the erosion of state consent as a norm. Beyond the case of Syria, China’s influence to the international legal order will remain a defining factor in the development of the ICC.